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defendant's
the new trial is affirmed.

F. No. 19421.

The appeal

In Bank.

ARD MIIIrON TO~INI et aL,
BAR OF CAI;IFOI{NIA, Respondent.

STATE

Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review.-In a discipliproceeding against an attorney, findings of fact by local
administrative committees and the Board of Bar Governors
not binding on the Supreme Court, which will weigh and
on the sufficiency of evidence to sustain the findings of
such board.
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Review-Burden of Proof.The burden is on a petitioner seeking review of the Board of
Governors' recommendation to show that the findings are
supported by the evidence or that the board's recommendaerroneous or unlawful.
Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Evidence.--Findings of
Board of Bar Governors that two attorneys solicited legal
business from a number of persons, most of whom had suffered
in automobile accidents, in violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 2, § a, were sustained by evidence
among other things, that none of the persons involved
the accidents was known
had an acquaintance with, or
a former client of either attorney, that visits made at a
and solicitations of legal employment were without
request or communication from the claimants or anyone
authorized to act on their behalf.
!d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Punishment.-Suspension of
attorneys from the practice of law for three years for
"ambulance
was not excessive punishment where the
record discloses a callous and brazen indifference to the obliof an
with the
of personal
See Cal.Jur.2d,
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4] Attorneys, § 174;
§
§ 172(9).

Attorneys,
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PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension
o:f attorneys for three years. Petitioners suspended for three
years.
George G. Olshausen for Petitioners.
Garrett H. Elmore for Respondent.
THE COURT.-This is a proceeding to review a recommendation of the Board of Governors of The State Bar that
petitioners be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of three years.
Two show cause orders directed to petitioners were consolidated for hearing. They charged petitioners with having solicited legal business from some 10 persons, most of
whom had suffered injuries in accidents, in violation of rule
2, section a, Rules of Professional Conduct ( 33 Cal.2d 27) . 1
The Board of Governors found the charges sustained and
recommended that petitioners be suspended for one year on
each count of the orders to show cause. In addition, the
board recommended that petitioner Tonini's suspension on
counts involving ·walter F. Horn, Anthony J. Vargas, and
the father of Ronald Reed, a minor, be made to run consecutively, the suspension on all other counts to run concurrently therewith. The same recommendation was made
concerning petitioner MacDonald, except that the three counts
recommended to run consecutively related to Eric Haak,
Bessie Manson and Sylvan Lehman.
PETITIONERS' CoNTENTIONS

First : That the findings of the Board of Governor-s are
not supported by the evidence.
This claim is untenable. [1] The rule is settled that in a
disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, findings of fact
by local administrative committees and the Board of Bar
Governors are not binding on the Supreme Court, which will
weigh and pass on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the findings of the Board of Bar Governors.
[2] It is also settled that the burden is upon the petitioner
seeking a review of the Board of Bar Governors' recommendation to show that the findings are not supported by the
evidence or that the recommendation of the Board of Bar
1
Rule 2, section a, Rules of Professional Conduct reads: ''A member
of the State Bar shall not solicit professional employment by advertise·
ment or otherwise.''
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for,:going rules to the rcconl in the
it discloses that petitioner Tonini was
law in 1D46, and that petitioner l\tlacadlllitted to praetice law in 19:YL Neither peti-

been the subject of any previous

pro-

of Saturday, April10, Hli54, Sylvan IJehman
with Clara 1\Iohr at Post and l;eavenworth
PnwcisccL 'l'hey were struck by au automobile
Post Street at about 8 p. m. Mr. Lehman susfracturwl hip and was taken to the City and County
thence to l\tlt. Zion Hospital about midnight. The
morning Mr. I1ehman was called upon by petitioner
at :M:t. Zion regarding his injuries, and he signed
n c:enllraet employing Mr. MacDonald the following day.
Mohr, 66 years of age, was injured in the same accid,·nL snstaining a broken leg. 'l'hc same rourse as to hospitalizal
was followed in her case as in that of JVIr. l~ehman.
On Jl:,; following morning petitioner MacDonald called upon
the hospital and talked to her about employment in
'rhe following day she signed a contract with him
he was employed to represent her.
11 p. m. on May 26, 1954, Erik Haak was involved
in a ~·ollision at the intersection of 'l'urk and 1<-,ranklin Streets,
a fractured neck and lesser injuries. He was
Emergency Hospital and then to Stanford Lane
al. The first or second day after the accident petitioner
}laeDunald called upon him at the hospital and solicited
Sisk was struck by a Greyhound bus about 7 p. m.
on ,Jmw 9, 1954. She died on the evening of the third day
having been in a comatose condition in Franklin
after the accident and during the short period of
illiH'SS. A man identifying himself as "Attorney l\IacDonald
or his representative" telephoned Thomas Sisk, father-in-law
of J\Iat'ie Sisk, for the purpose of locating his daughter and
also
sistt>r of Marie Sisk in order that he might talk to
tlwm regarding the "injuries" to Marie. On the morning
of .Tune 13, petitioner MacDonald appeared at the family
home in Southern California for the purpose of contacting and
L. P. Sisk, the surviving husband of Marie Sisk.

L
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suffered minor in.
She was taken to Central
officers invesshe was contacted
himself as "Mr. Macof Mr. Tonini." The caller stated
to see her about the accident. An appointment
for noon that
at petitioners' offices. She
the
and the person who had previously telephoned called
that afternoon wanting to
know why she had not come clown to the office, and he offered
to come to her house.
On August 5, 1954, Walter Horn, a machinist, was seriously
injured when struck by an automobile at 5th and Jessie
Streets at 2 :10 in the morning. He was taken in a semiconscious condition to Central Emergency Hospital, where
he was registered as '' vValter Harm.'' About 7 a. m. of that
day he vvas transferred to the City and County Hospital.
Petitioner 'l'onini saw the injured man at the City and County
Hospital twice on August 5 (the day of the accident), once
briefly in the late afternoon and then a couple of hours later
in the evening, at which time a contract of employment was
signed by Mr. Horn. At the time Mr. Horn was admitted
to the hospital he had an alcoholic breath and was extremely
shaky, so much so that the nurses placed side boards or side
rails on his bed to prevent him from falling out of it.
Early in the morning the following day, August 6, petitioner Tonini returned to the hospital and certain events took
place regarding the verification of a complaint in an action,
"Walter Harm, Plaintiff, vs. Allen E. Hertel et al." Petitioner Tonini signed the name "\Valter Harm" as the person
verifying a complaint he had prepared and later filed.
At this time Mr. Horn was able to sign his own name, as is
indicated by the fact that on the same date he had signed
a ''Request for Admission and Agreement to Reimburse.''
To the verification is affixed petitioner Tonini's signature as
a notary public. Petitioner Tonini signed the verification
with the intention of concealing Mr. Horn's mental condition
at the time from defendants in the action which he was filing.
This was done so that the inference would not be drawn that
Mr. Horn was not then alert and lucid.
An examination of the complaint indicates on its face that
petitioner endeavored to make it appear that Walter IIarm
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son of William R. Reed
in
Francisco. About
and neighbors went to the City
m. Mr. Reed, his
Hospital. The Reeds returned to San Jose in
morning hours of August 31. In the afternoon
Mr. Reed called at the office of a San Jose
who had previously represented him. Shortly after
of the same day petitioner Tonini, identifying himas Attorney Badliaco of San Francisco, telephoned Mr.
He solicited the case and asked Mr. Reed to come
up to San Francisco. Mr. Reed refused, and suggested
10 a. m. the next day, at which time he went to petitioners'
There petitioner Tonini revealed his true identity.
n~-~.~ ... :~~
Tonini told Mr. Reed to make arrangements to go
attorney in San Jose (Mr. Manina), described as "his
tt<::lau•~u~

n<>1"f'YIA'?' H

On September 23, 1954, about 8 p. m., Mr. Clarence Urdahl,
was struck by an automobile. He was first taken to
Emergency Hospital, then removed to the Southern
Hospital. He sustained serious injuries. Peter Gray
family name was Garadis), an experienced claims
111;n'\si~i,.ll
and adjuster and licensed as an insurance and
real estate broker, was a long-time acquaintance of petitioner
Tonini. About 7 a. m. the following morning petitioner Tonini
Le1eiJJcwrieu Mr. Gray and asked him to call on Mr. Urdahl,
petitioner described as ''a client of his who was in the
whom he was supposed to go see on that morning
and that he was unable to get there himself, but could later
in that day.'' Petitioner Tonini supplied Mr. Gray with
name of the hospital and room number.
Mr. Gray went to see Mr. Urdahl, discussed the accident
and fees on behalf of petitioner Tonini and obtained Mr.
446 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads in part as follows:
the pleading is verified by the attorney, or any other person
one of the parties, he shall set forth in the affidavit the reasons
is not made by one of the parties. ''
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Urdahl's signature to a fee contract which he
had prepared in his own handwriting.
Mr. MacDonald stated that at approximately 9 a. m. the
same morning, petitioner Tonini phoned from his office to
his home saying, "I have got a new client in the SP Hospital.
Pete Garadis has seen this man, and he, the man, has signed
a 25 per cent contract. Go out.'' Petitioner MacDonald
went to the hospital about 10 or 11 a. m., as an associate of
petitioner Tonini, and had a conference with Mr. Urdahl.
At noon on the same day Mr. Gray saw petitioner MacDonald at his law office when he brought the paper signed
by Mr. Urdahl. He told petitioner MacDonald that it was
"the memorandum Mr. Urdahl signed"; that "Mr. Tonini
had called him [Gray] and asked him to go see the man.'' The
same afternoon petitioner MacDonald again called on Mr.
Urdahl at the hospital.
On October 28, 1954, Anthony Vargas was injured while
driving a mail truck which collided with another vehicle.
He was taken to Central Emergency Hospital, where he
remained about one half hour. He then reported back to
the Post Office garage and went home. The evening of the
next day Mr. Vargas found a card under his doorstep, that
of petitioner Tonini, on the reverse of which was written,
"Anthony Vargas, call me at home, GLenwood 3-7336, call
collect, Tonini." The following day Mr. Vargas called the
telephone number and talked with petitioner Tonini. The
latter said he had placed the card under the doorstep; "that
he would like to be engaged as my attorney'' and to get in
touch with him at his office. Mr. Vargas later met Mr.
MacDonald in his law office and discussed the case.
The record further discloses that none of the persons
involved in the accidents was known to, or had an acquaintance with, or was a former client of either petitioner, and
that the visits and solicitations were without prior request or
communication from the claimants or anyone authorized to
act on their behalf.
Petitioner Tonini on several other occasions caused his
clients to engage in fictitious transactions, and he failed on
occasions to make a proper accounting to his clients.
On the night before a committee hearing of The State Bar,
petitioners went to the home of Mrs. Manson, and petitioner
Tonini told her she should hear what he had to say before
she appeared to testify and that it would mean something to

1'ecommendcd
the
Bar Governo1·s was excessive.
contention is devoid of merit.
violated was designed to prohibit
obtaining contracts of employment.
present proceeding the record discloses a callous and
brazen indifference to the obligations of an
with
the
of personal gain. Under these circumstances
tiom:rs should be removed from the practice of law for a
period of time in order that they may realize
of their ways and rehabilitate thrmsdves brfore
resuming a place in the ranks of the
Water·man v. State Bar, 14 CaL2d 224
with a prior record, admitting three
lance
and who gave false testimony to the
wa'\ disbarred.
v. State Bar, 2 Cal.2d 71
P.2d 206], an attarpersisted in advertising for divorce business
suspension for such conduct, was disbarrPd.
ordered that petitioners be
from the practhe law in this stat<' for the period of tlJrPe
30 days after the date of the
o[ this order.
agree with the majority that the rccorcl discloses
conduct of a somewhat serious nature on the
both petitioners, l am of the
ihat the disciordered js too severe. Taking into cmJ::;id<'ration the
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age and prof,~SS!Ollal OV>~C>PH>n
nature of the unprofessional conduct on their
by the
it is my
that a
for the period of one year would be more in
discipline imposed for similar conduct in other cases
have come before this court.
It should be obvious that a
of law is almost
not believe that such severe
on young,
disclosed
the record here.
For the foregoing reasons I would suspend petitioners from
the practice of law for the period of one year.
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied June 6,
1956, and the time for commencement of their suspension was
extended to commence August 15, 1956. Carter, J., was of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 23976.

In Bank.

May 18, 1956.]

[i

CESAR LAMBRETON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
[1] Negligence- Serious and Wilful Misconduct.- Serious and
wilful misconduct means something different from and much
more than negligence, however gross; such misconduct is
basically the antithesis of negligence, and the two types of
behavior are mutually exclusive.
[2a, 2b] Workmen's Compensation-Time to Make Claim-Effect
of Amendment.-A workmen's compensation claim expressly
stating that "the employer was grossly negligent" cannot serve
as the basis for a later "amendment" setting forth a charge
of serious and wilful misconduct which would impose an entirely new and different legal liability on the employer where,
at no time within 12 months from the date of injury, was it
[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 8; Am.Jur., Negligence, § 48.
[2] See Oal.Jur., Workmen's
§ 160; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 489.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 8; [2] Workmen's
Compensation, § 146; [3-5] Workmen's Compensation, § 123.
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